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The social context of paranoia 
David J Harper 
 
“Psychiatry”, suggests Hornstein (2009a: 6), “is the most contested field in 
medicine” and, as Bracken and Thomas (2001: 724) note, “[i]t is hard to 
imagine the emergence of ‘antipædiatrics’ or ‘critical anæsthetics’ 
movements”. But why is this so? One of the reasons is that there is often a 
fundamental disagreement about the meaning attributed to experience and, 
who has the right to confer that meaning. Experiences like paranoia are often 
decontextualised and stripped of meaning. For example, psychiatry variously 
classifies paranoia as a sub-type of schizophrenia, a separate delusional 
disorder or as a type of personality disorder. Yet arcane discussions of the 
differences between diagnostic sub-types distract from commonalities in the 
way paranoia is experienced.   
 
In this chapter I investigate the concept of paranoia, paying attention to its 
contested nature. I take a deliberately broad view, seeing it as an apparently 
unwarranted fear and belief that others intend to harm one in some way, 
leading us to respond to others in a fearful, wary and even hostile manner.  
Deciding on the best way to address such distressing feelings very much 
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depends on what we think paranoia is and so, the chapter begins with an 
examination of some of the conceptual assumptions embedded in the notion.  
 
Problematising paranoia 
 
One of the core assumptions made when diagnosing paranoia is that the 
person is fearful or hostile because their beliefs about the intentions of others 
are false.  In simple terms, their beliefs are delusional. According to the 
American Psychiatric Association a delusion is: 
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is 
firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or 
evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by 
other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g. it s not an 
article or religious faith). When a false belief involves a value 
judgement, it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgement is so 
extreme as to defy credibility. Delusional conviction occurs on a 
continuum and can sometimes be inferred from an individual’s 
behaviour.  It is often difficult to distinguish between a delusion and 
an overvalued idea (APA, 2000: 821). 
For a delusion to be considered paranoid (or ‘persecutory’ in psychiatric 
terms) the central theme of the belief is that the person (or someone close to 
them) is being victimised or conspired against in some way and there is an 
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explicit intention to harm them. 
 
Definitions like these have been challenged on conceptual and empirical 
grounds over the years (e.g. Boyle, 2002; David, 1999; Freeman & Garety, 
2000; Harper, 1996, 2004; Moor & Tucker, 1979; Oltmanns, 1988; Spitzer, 1995).  
Indeed, one commentator has noted that: “despite the façade created by 
psychiatric textbooks, there is no acceptable (rather than accepted) definition 
of a delusion” (David, 1999: 17). There have been attempts to re-label 
delusions as ‘abnormal beliefs’ or ‘unusual beliefs’. Oltmanns (1988) has 
argued that rather than trying to settle on a fixed definition of delusion, it 
might be better to elucidate seven ‘defining characteristics’ by which 
delusions might be recognised with none of the characteristics being seen 
either as essential or sufficient for a diagnosis. This approach clearly provides 
some flexibility but this can also be problematic in that diagnoses can prove to 
be too flexible. As the Rosenhan (1973) study showed it can be quite hard to 
prove that one does not fulfill psychiatric criteria once one has been given a 
diagnosis, and diagnosers appear to show a great deal of flexibility in which 
criteria they draw on and how they interpret them (Harper, 1994). For 
example, if a person does not fit the criteria for delusion, the DSM definition 
of paranoid personality disorder is very similar: “distrust and suspiciousness 
of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent…individuals 
with this disorder assume that other people will exploit, harm or deceive 
them, even if no evidence exists to support this expectation” (APA, 2000: 690).   
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Boyle (2002: 279) argues that diagnostic debates are so long-lived because 
researchers have an ‘assumptive framework’ which remains ‘unexamined or 
even unarticulated’. In this chapter, I examine the assumptive framework of 
contemporary notions of paranoia and delusion and argue that the Oltmanns 
approach, like that of the DSM-IV, rests on four fundamental assumptions 
that obscure more helpful ways of looking at relatively enduring beliefs, fears 
and ways of relating to others. 
 
 Naïve realism 
One of the most basic problems is the assumption that it is possible to prove 
that a person’s beliefs are false – a naively realist worldview. Yet we know 
that most people end up with a diagnosis of paranoia without independent 
empirical investigation – probably the most that will have happened is a 
psychiatric interview with the person and possibly a family member. Maher 
has argued assessment of the plausibility of a person’s beliefs is “typically 
made by a clinician on the basis of ‘common sense’, and not on the basis of a 
systematic evaluation of empirical data [and that it is not] customary to 
present counterevidence to the patient; it is not even common to present 
vigorous counterargument” (Maher, 1992: 261). These observations have 
empirical support: based on a study of out-patient psychiatric consultations 
McCabe, et al reported that: “[w]hen patients attempted to present their 
psychotic symptoms as a topic of conversation, the doctors hesitated and 
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avoided answering the patients' questions, indicating reluctance to engage 
with these concerns” (2002: 1150). It is ironic that service users are required to 
provide proof for their claims but the threshold appears to be lower for 
professionals.  Indeed, researchers often report examples of delusions that 
either turned out to be true or which had a ‘kernel of truth’ in them (Barrett, 
1988). 
 
If the diagnosis of a delusion is based more on a judgement of plausibility 
than an empirical investigation, then it means that different diagnosers may 
arrive at different conclusions - posing problems for the reliability of 
diagnoses of delusions. Of the few studies of diagnostic reliability reported, 
despite significant methodological weaknesses, quite varied results are found 
with judgements of the bizarreness of delusions particularly poor (Bell, 
Halligan & Ellis, 2006; Harper, 1999). However, how many of us could say 
that we have objective evidence for any, let alone all, of our beliefs? Is it even 
possible or desirable to have ‘evidence’ for political, ethical, and spiritual or 
religious beliefs?  So the idea that beliefs are straightforwardly empirically 
verifiable is problematic. Given this, it is perhaps not unsurprising that 
judging whether a belief is abnormal in some way is even more of a challenge. 
 
How abnormal are abnormal beliefs? 
It is commonly assumed that the kinds of beliefs which are diagnosed as 
delusional are rare and such beliefs are statistically abnormal.  However, 
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when surveys of the general public are conducted, we find that potentially 
‘delusional’ beliefs are not as unusual as might be thought. For example, one 
UK survey reported that 45% of people believed in telepathy, 45% believed in 
the ability to predict the future, 42% believed in hypnotism, 39% believed in 
life after death, 39% believed in faith healing and 31% of people believed in 
ghosts (Social Surveys/Gallup Poll Ltd, 1995). A more recent American 
Gallup survey reported slightly lower percentages though belief in ESP was at 
41%, but 73% of Americans believed in at least one of 10 paranormal items 
(Moore, 2005).  
 
It is even harder to evaluate beliefs when it comes to social judgments about 
others. A 1994 Gallup survey reported that 24% of people admitted lying at 
least once the previous day and 64% thought they had been lied to at least 
once the previous day (Social Surveys/Gallup Poll Ltd, 1994). In a further 
survey, 60% of people felt that one could not be too careful in dealing with 
people and only 37% felt most people could be trusted (Social 
Surveys/Gallup Poll Ltd, 1997).  Given these levels of trust in others it seems 
that some level of paranoia is relatively commonplace. 
 
One objection to this might be that belief in ghosts and so on is a different 
matter to belief in something ‘properly’ delusional. However, Emmanuelle 
Peters and colleagues at the Institute of Psychiatry have conducted some 
interesting studies using the Peters Delusions Inventory or PDI  (Peters, Joseph 
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& Garety, 1999a), a short self-report questionnaire containing questions about 
beliefs drawn from schedules of psychiatric symptoms. It is deliberately 
phrased using everyday words rather than psychiatric terminology – 
examples include ‘do you ever feel as if people seem to drop hints about you 
or say things with a double meaning?’ and ‘do you ever feel as if you are 
being persecuted in some way?’ For each belief three ratings are made: the 
conviction with which it is held; the amount of distress associated with it; and 
the extent to which the person is preoccupied with it. 
 
In one study Peters and her colleagues reported that although ‘psychotic 
inpatients’ had higher scores on the PDI than the general population (Peters, 
et al, 1999a) there was also considerable overlap between the two groups. In 
other words, some members of the general public scored higher on the 
delusions survey than those who were psychiatric inpatients. This finding has 
since been replicated using a much larger general population sample (Peters, 
et al, 2004). Where the two groups in this study appeared to differ was that the 
general public were less preoccupied with, distressed by and convinced by 
their beliefs. 
 
In a separate investigation, Peters, et al (1999b) compared members of New 
Religious Movements (Druids and Hare Krishnas), non-religious people, 
Christians and ‘deluded people’ on their scores on the PDI measure. They 
found no differences between the members of New Religious Movements and 
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‘deluded people’ in terms of either the number of beliefs held or the strength 
with which they were held. The only differences between the groups were in 
how preoccupied the participants were with their beliefs and how distressed 
they were about them.   
 
Thus, whereas traditional psychiatric approaches assume that it is the fact of 
holding a belief considered delusional that is the problem, this research 
indicates that the key issue is the relationship people have with their beliefs – 
in other words, whether your beliefs get in the way of the life you wish to 
lead. 
 
A number of studies report similar results with the PDI in France, the 
Netherlands and New Zealand, with anywhere between 3%-20% of the 
population holding beliefs which would, conventionally, be regarded as 
delusional. In another study, nearly half of a sample of British college 
students reported an experience of paranoia including a clear statement that 
they felt there had been a planned intention to harm them -- the key criterion 
for a diagnosis of a paranoid or persecutory delusion (Ellett, Lopes & 
Chadwick, 2003). Freeman has noted that a: “conservative estimate is that 10–
15% of the general population regularly experience paranoid thoughts” 
(Freeman, 2007: 430). In a community survey of a random sample of 7, 076 
people in the Netherlands, van Os, et al (2000) reported that 8.7% of the 
sample had delusional beliefs but that 3.3% had ‘true’ delusions. In other 
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words, 8.7% of the population held beliefs that fulfilled most of the diagnostic 
criteria for delusions but did not require clinical intervention – they did not 
appear to be causing the person or those around them clinically significant 
levels of distress or causing problems in their daily life. This means that 
although 5.4% of the sample had beliefs which psychiatrists would diagnose 
as delusions, they were managing to go about their everyday lives apparently 
without problems. Similarly, a survey of the US general population suggested 
that 4.41% of the population met the criteria for a diagnosis of paranoid 
personality disorder (Grant, et al, 2004). 
 
What are we to make of surveys like these? They show that ‘paranoid’ 
experiences are not nearly as unusual or abnormal as we are led to believe. 
Since referrals to mental health services in no way match these levels, this 
either indicates a serious level of under-diagnosis or that many people with 
such experiences do not require help from mental health services. How might 
some people manage to hold beliefs which might be seen as delusional and 
yet manage to avoid being referred to, or seeking help from, mental health 
services? Weeks and James (1997) have researched the similar topic of 
‘eccentricity’ and identify a number of people who remain happy and 
engaged with the world despite holding unconventional views.  Sun Ra and 
David Icke are examples of people whose beliefs others might find unusual 
but who do not appear to have experienced distress because of their beliefs or 
been in receipt of mental health services. 
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Sun Ra was a black American avant garde musician who, from the 1950s until 
his death in 1993, led a jazz group called the Arkestra. He claimed to be from 
the planet Saturn, tracing this realisation to a religious vision he had in the 
1930s (Szwed, 1998). He has been the subject of a number of documentary 
films including Don Letts’ Brother from Another Planet – The Sun Ra Story. 
David Icke was a BBC TV sports presenter who became involved in the Green 
party in the late 1980s. A week after resigning from the Green Party he held a 
press conference to announce that he had become a “channel for the Christ 
spirit” and predicted that the world would end in 1997 after a series of natural 
disasters. He has gone on to write a number of books about his ideas, in 
particular that the world is being run by a race of shape-shifting alien lizards 
who have inter-bred with humans and can appear in human form (see 
www.davidicke.com). According to journalist Jon Ronson his career is “a 
global sensation” and “he lectures to packed houses all over the world” 
(Ronson, 2001: 151).   
 
Is paranoia meaningless? 
The influence of biological and reductionist traditions in psychiatry has meant 
that mental health professionals have traditionally been little interested in the 
content of people’s experiences. Thus, historically, there has been more 
interest in whether someone heard a voice rather than in what the voice said.  
Similarly, the assumption has generally been that beliefs seen as delusional or 
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paranoid are meaningless -- an ‘empty speech act’ (Berrios, 1991) -- and that 
exploring them will mean that the clinician is ‘colluding’ with the belief.   
 
However, there is mounting evidence that such beliefs are full of meaning.  
One study reported that those with a diagnosis of delusions scored as highly 
on a measure of purpose and meaning in life as those training to be Anglican 
priests (Roberts, 1991). This suggests that these beliefs may actually give 
people a meaning in life even though, in the case of those who feel paranoid, 
the meaning may not be at all pleasant (Harper, 2008). This is, perhaps, not 
that surprising: if you are unemployed, poor and living alone on a frightening 
housing estate with little money to spend in occupying yourself, it may be 
functional to imagine you are Jesus, or are being followed by MI5. Other 
research has reported finding a correspondence between the themes in a 
person’s ‘delusions’ and their everyday life or their past (Rhodes & Jakes, 
2000).   
 
An important line of research has been the investigation of links between 
paranoid beliefs, social inequality and victimisation.  For example, John 
Mirowsky and Catherine Ross (1983) conducted a survey of the general 
population in El Paso, Texas and across the border in Juarez, Mexico. They 
reported that those with the most paranoid beliefs tended to be working class 
Mexican women -- those who were in social positions characterised by 
powerlessness, the threat of victimisation and exploitation. Again, this should 
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not be all that surprising. When you are not fully in control of your life - 
when, for example, you could be sacked from your poorly paid job at any 
moment - in a very real sense others are in control of your life and it may feel 
as if they are persecuting you.  
 
Racism also plays a part here, and a range of empirical work indicates that it 
may be one of the causes of the high rates of psychosis in the black 
population. For example, black and Asian people in the UK are 50 per cent 
more likely to be diagnosed with schizophrenia than white people (King, et al, 
1994). Moreover, the prevalence of schizophrenia diagnoses is higher among 
black people living in majority white areas (Boydell, et al, 2001). A community 
survey in the Netherlands noted that those meeting diagnostic criteria for 
delusions were more likely to report having experienced discrimination 
previously (Janssen, et al, 2003).  Similarly, Karlsen and Nazroo (2002) have 
noted that those belonging to minority ethnic groups were much more likely 
to have psychotic symptoms if they reported experiencing racist victimisation 
in the previous year. Lastly, experiences of victimisation and stressful life 
events were among the correlates of psychotic symptoms in a large UK 
community survey (Johns, et al, 2004).  
 
John Cromby and I have argued that, rather than seeing paranoia as a kind of 
belief, it makes sense to view it as a kind of story that is embodied within us 
as a result of our life experiences (Cromby & Harper, 2009). It may help 
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someone to make sense of a confusing world -- where they feel influenced by 
forces beyond their immediate perceptions – to connect apparently 
unconnected happenings. It may be that, in its focus on whether supposedly 
delusional beliefs are literally true, reductionist psychiatry has missed the 
more important issue that many such beliefs may be metaphorically true, 
reflecting the influence on the person’s life of a range of stressful experiences, 
including those resulting from social inequalities.1
 
 
So far, in this chapter, I have argued that the assumptive framework 
underpinning the psychiatric notion of paranoia presupposes: a naïve realist 
model of the world; that paranoid beliefs are inherently pathological and 
abnormal; and that they are meaningless.  But who is given the power to 
make these judgements and what is the basis for the legitimacy of their 
claims? 
 
Who gets to decide what is “normal”? 
Of course, one of the key assumptions made when we say someone has a 
delusion is that this is a statement of fact rather than opinion. In his seminal 
social constructionist analysis of delusions over twenty years ago, Heise 
(1988) argued that in the diagnostic interview one person’s version of reality 
(the mental health professional’s) is seen as more true than the other person’s 
                                                 
1 This perspective is, of course, beautifully illustrated in R.D. Laing’s (1960) case study of 
“The Ghost of the Weed Garden”. 
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version of reality (the service user’s) as the professional is granted, by virtue 
of their social position, the power to define reality. Eugenie Georgaca has 
investigated this empirically, using discourse analysis to examine interviews 
conducted with psychiatric service users considered delusional (2000, 2004).  
She argues that, contrary to received opinion, service users are able to provide 
evidence for their beliefs and to engage in discussion with others about them.  
The problem which arose is that what some of her interviewees saw as 
persuasive evidence was not persuasive to her.  Moreover, she noted that 
many of their claims were epistemologically ambiguous in that they would be 
hard to verify empirically and they were certainly impossible to test within 
the context of an interview (as occurs in most psychiatric diagnostic 
interviews). She argued that judging another’s beliefs to be delusional was an 
interactional accomplishment, one in which the hearer of the belief (and their 
assumptions about the world) was important but ignored within the 
psychiatric literature.   
 
The psychiatrist Suman Fernando has made a similar point: 
in the process of making a diagnosis, judgements are hypothesized as 
symptoms and illnesses -- as 'things' that exist in some way separately 
from the people who make the judgements and from the people 
('patients') who are said to 'have' them (Fernando, 1997: 16). 
In other words, when we say that someone “has a deluded belief”, what we 
are really saying is “that idea is implausible to me”, “I don’t understand that 
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idea” or even “that idea is dangerous”. The process by which we come to 
these judgements occurs between people in conversation and it is likely to be 
influenced by all of the things that make us different from each other. There is 
one area of belief which throws this assumption into particular relief.  
 
In a sense, when mental health professionals make judgements about whether 
beliefs are normal, they are making proxy judgements on behalf of all of us. 
But what is the standard against which they are judging beliefs? If this 
standard remains implicit, and if mental health professionals are actually 
significantly different from the general population, then this causes further 
problems for diagnosis. In fact, this is the case with religious belief where a 
number of surveys suggest that it is mental health professionals who are the 
‘abnormal’ ones, statistically speaking. For example, Smiley (2001) asked 
British clinical psychologists about their religious belief and found that, 
whereas 61% of psychologists reported having no religious belief, or were 
agnostic or atheistic, only 28% of the population as a whole did.   
 
 
Implications:  Changing assumptions and changing society 
 
We have seen how the ‘assumptive framework’ constructing paranoia 
influences both how it is experienced and how it is diagnosed by 
professionals.  Here, I outline some implications of this analysis for practice, 
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research and policy. 
 
Practice 
Therapists need to acknowledge that judgments about beliefs are social and 
cultural and so it may be more helpful to focus on the 'fit' between a person’s 
beliefs and the lives they wish to lead rather than on the veracity of the belief.  
There could be a focus on the content and context of the belief, particularly its 
historical and biographical context, given that many of these beliefs appear to 
occur in late adolescence and/or following experiences of victimization.  
Therapeutic factors in alternative groups seem to involve helping the person 
to develop an explanation for their experiences which: makes sense to them; 
does not unduly distress them; puts them in contact with a community which 
shares those meanings since social isolation is generally anti-therapeutic; 
where there are often rituals, practices and other regular activities which 
ground the person in this community; and which allows them to lead the lives 
they wish to (Romme & Escher, 2000).   
 
The development of paranoia support groups can help to combat the isolation 
that can be a consequence of some frightening beliefs and is an example of 
how people with distressing beliefs can help each other to cope (Bullimore, 
2010a; James, 2003; Knight, 2009).  For those not able or willing to meet with 
others, the internet can be a useful resource though this can become unhelpful 
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if it begins to dominate the person’s life.   
 
Community psychology is another useful approach.  May (2007) has 
discussed the development of community-based approaches for people 
having experiences others consider psychotic.  Sue Holland’s (1991) White 
City project developed a model of social action psychotherapy.  She focused 
on women on a West London estate, offering a staged approach beginning 
with a number of sessions of individual therapy, leading into group work and 
then into collective social action.  Of course, therapeutic work can only go so 
far and there is a need to influence researchers and policy makers too.   
 
Research 
An obstacle to research progress is the psychiatric diagnostic enterprise itself.  
I would argue that, certainly in the area of psychosis, diagnostic categories are 
actively unhelpful in that their use requires us to make many a priori 
assumptions about the nature of the phenomena they purportedly categorise.  
As Rogers and Pilgrim (2003) note, researchers attempting to trace the 
relationship between social disadvantage and mental health are often forced 
to use such categories as epidemiological data are structured by them.  
Fortunately, the availability of dimensional experience or symptom-based 
measures like the PDI provide an alternative. 
 
We need, instead, to return to a focus on experience.  What is it like to feel 
 18 
paranoid?  Here qualitative research can be helpful in capturing the nuances 
of subjective experience. In particular it can be helpful to investigate 
experience outside of the clinic and to explore trust, mistrust and suspicion in 
a range of contexts, including the everyday (King, et al, 2008; Willig, 1997). In 
trying to understand experience we need to use language but this, too, 
contains many presuppositions. Indeed, Wallcraft and Michaelson (2001) have 
argued for the development of a ‘survivor discourse’ in order to reclaim the 
language used to describe their experience back from professionals.  We need 
to rethink the language we use to describe paranoia and similar experiences. 
But what alternatives to the terms ‘paranoia’ or ‘delusion’ are there? The 
move from ‘auditory hallucination’ to ‘voice hearing’ in the 1990s was useful 
because it was behaviourally descriptive, carried little conceptual baggage 
and was open to different interpretations. The term ‘paranoia’ is challenged 
by some because it is thought to imply that such beliefs are inherently 
pathological - but this need not be the case and some survivors use it to 
describe their experiences since it is widely understood. There is much less 
agreement about the term ‘delusion’ or even about the term ‘belief’.  
However, there is no obvious replacement. I do not think the term ‘unusual 
belief’ is necessarily better than delusion – unusual to who? Other alternatives 
abound (e.g. ‘unshared beliefs’, ‘having an alternative sense of reality’ or 
‘heightened sensitivity to others’ or Tamasin Knight’s ‘beliefs that might not 
be easily confirmable’ see Hornstein, 2009b: 136).   
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Whatever words we use to describe paranoia, I would argue that we need to 
move research away from its focus on truth as a key factor given that it is 
rarely the key issue. David Heise made a similar point over twenty years ago 
when he argued that the “factuality of belief” be discarded as a diagnostic 
criterion and the “focus on sociality sharpened” (Heise, 1998: 270). If 
researchers were less enchanted by whether beliefs were true it might be 
easier to focus on the ‘fit’ between a person's beliefs and the life they wish to 
lead.  What influences are there on that ‘fit’? How do some people manage to 
live lives as ‘mystics’, ‘eccentrics’ or even ‘extremists’  (the subject of 
investigations by Peters, 2001; Weeks & James, 1997; and Ronson, 2001 
respectively) rather than as psychiatric patients? If we begin to see ‘delusions’ 
as positions that people take up and/or are positioned in, in discourse what 
alternative modes of understanding might this open up? Fruitful avenues 
appear to be narrative (de Rivera & Sarbin, 1998) and dialogical models 
(Hallam & O’Connor, 2002).  Indeed, how is it that some belief claims seem 
more plausible than others, or to some people than others? 
 
Policy 
 [t]he more equitable the distribution of wealth in a country, the more 
trusting its people will be (Uslaner, 2002: 230 cited in Freeman & 
Freeman, 2008). 
When mental health practitioners seek to influence policymakers there is a 
danger that they suggest solutions at the level of the individual – usually 
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some form of medication or psychotherapy. Apart from being self-serving, 
this approach is too costly to be available for all those who might ‘need’ it 
and, moreover, it is ameliorative, rather than preventative. On the rare 
occasions that mental health services are involved in preventative efforts, the 
concern is often to target intervention on ‘high risk groups’. However, 
Huppert suggests that this may be short-sighted as: “the majority who 
develop disorder come not from the high risk group, but from the general 
population, simply because the members of the general population are so 
numerous” (Huppert, 2009: 109). Instead, Huppert makes a case for focusing 
interventions at the population level since: “a small shift in the population 
mean is associated with a substantial reduction in the prevalence of disorder” 
(Huppert, 2009: 109-110). 
 
When we look at paranoia at the population level, it is hard to say whether we 
are ‘more’ paranoid than we were in the past (Freeman & Freeman, 2008) but, 
surveys show that levels of trust between people in Britain have been 
decreasing over the last fifty years. Moreover, neighbourhoods reporting low 
levels of overt mutual trust are the most disadvantaged and where there is 
most social disorder like crime, vandalism and so on (Ross, Mirowsky & 
Pribesh, 2001). What is interesting is that, at the population level, levels of 
trust appear to be correlated not with overall levels of income, but with the 
difference between the poorest and the richest in society – in other words, 
they are related to levels of income inequality. In The Spirit Level, Richard 
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Wilkinson and Kate Pickett present persuasive evidence of this. In general, 
those countries with the lowest levels of income inequality (e.g. Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and Finland) are also those countries reporting the highest 
levels of trust. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) show that a similar pattern is also 
seen in the USA between States which vary in terms of income inequality. 
Moreover, it appears that as inequality increases, trust decreases. Addressing 
such inequality requires action beyond the clinic. 
 
When we use the notion of paranoia to diagnose others we may obscure the 
real causes of their distress, locating it instead in faulty brain mechanisms, 
rather than out there in a frequently hostile world. Likewise, when we 
experience paranoia we have the sense that we are the ones who know what 
is really going on in the world but paranoid ideas may simply mystify the 
causes of the real inequalities and victimisations we have experienced, 
transforming them into a dramatic personalised narrative (Harper, 2008).  
Perhaps we can ‘decode’ the metaphorical meaning of paranoia, enabling 
people to trace the influence of power on their life (May, 2007)? The liberation 
psychologist, Ignacio Martin-Baro described a process which he termed 
conscientización whereby people could educate and liberate themselves from 
oppressive social conditions (Burton, 2004). If we are to fully locate paranoia 
in its social context, we need not only to raise awareness of that context but 
also to seek to change it.   
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